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Book Reviews
When Killing is Wrong: Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Courts,
by Arthur 1. Dyck (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press 2001)
Arthur J. Dyck's new book, When Killing is Wrong: Physician-Assisted
Suicide and the Courts, is a valuable addition to the literature on physicianassisted suicide. In this short book (127 pages), Dyck discusses the
"conflicting modes of moral argumentation" that are present in the debate
about the legalization of physician-assisted suicide. He vigorously defends
the sanctity of life ethic and critiques the contemporary assault on this ethic
in recent judicial opinions and in the works of certain modem
philosophers. Despite some flaws, which are discussed below, I think this
book is well worth reading.
The book focuses narrowly on Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco
v. Quill, the 1997 Supreme Court decisions rejecting the claim that laws
banning assisted suicide violate the Constitution. Dyck discusses the key
lower court opinions in these cases and then finally discusses the key
Supreme Court opinions. Dyck, who is the Mary B. Saltonsall Professor of
Population Ethics in the School of Public Health and a member of the
Divinity School faculty at Harvard University, is not a legal scholar. His
treatment of these cases focuses not so much on the legal doctrine or on
constitutional interpretation or on the proper role of judicial review in our
society, but rather on the moral frameworks that are implicit in the varying
judicial approaches to assisted suicide.
His analysis critiques, from a philosophical perspective, the moral
theories and the underlying theological anthropology expressed by those
who support a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. According
to Dyck, the physician-assisted suicide position "would leave homicide
law without a principled basis." (p. 8.) "[T]here is [, then,] an urgent need
to examine carefully what philosophical justification exists for the
principles that now guide and support homicide law." (Id.) His "book
intends to provide such a justification." (Id.) He considers, accordingly,
"what makes killing wrong, when it is [wrong] , and what moral and legal
concepts will provide a principled basis for homicide laws" and also for
laws banning assisted suicide. (p. 7.)
In this discussion, Dyck discusses three traditions that he claims are
vying for ascendancy in American law. First, is the tradition rooted in
Judaism and Christianity. Second, is the tradition rooted in Hobbes. Third,
is the tradition that is traced to a particular reading of the thought of John
Stuart Mill. In Dyck's account, the first two traditions combined to create a
176

Linacre Quarterly

"Natural Rights Synthesis" that provides a rationale for modern Western
democracies and for their long-standing protection for the right to life and
their opposition to direct killing. In contrast, the third tradition appeals to
utility as the basis for rights. This tradition, which he contends has emerged
in recent court decisions favoring assisted suicide, does not provide a basis
for retaining the Anglo-American legal traditions' affirmation of the right
to life. Dyck maintains that this rupture with the long-standing premises of
our legal and moral traditions threatens "the protection of life and liberty
necessary to perpetuating communal life ... ." (p. 13.)
The way out of this situation, according to Dyck, is to emphasize the
elements in the Millian tradition that are supportive of the traditional ethic
and to incorporate these elements with the Natural Rights Synthesis into a
new synthesis. This new synthesis would avoid the theological conflicts
implicit in these varying traditions while providing support for a view of
the sacredness of human life "such that the law reflects, teaches, and
supports the incalculable worth of the life of each individual." (p; 119.)
As noted, much of this book is a detailed review of the moral
reasoning that is either explicit or implicit in court opinions on physicianassisted suicide. Most of this analysis is full of insights into what is really
at stake in these opinions. The debates in these cases are not simply about
fine points of legal doctrine; they reflect rather a deep divide about human
nature, about the meaning of freedom, about the value of human life, and
about the nature of moral reasoning.
Of special value is Dyck's focus on the communal aspects of this
controversy. (Dyck's earlier book, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities:
The Moral Bonds of Community (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press 1994), explored
this aspect of rights in great detail.) He does emphasize that the intentional
killing of an innocent person is wrong because "it violates an individual's
natural and inalienable right to life and all the expectations and claims it
makes on human behavior." (p. 96.) But, he is particularly persuasive in
explaining how "the act of killing oneself or someone else violates and
threatens to undermine the mutual moral responsibilities that are requisites
of individual and communal life." (Id.) This is a welcome corrective to the
more typical discussions of these issues with their exaggerated emphasis
on individual autonomy.
There are some weaknesses in this book. First, I found it striking that
there is almost no mention of abortion in thi s book. His entire legal and
moral discussion of physician-assisted suicide is completely detached from
its connection to abortion. I realize that physician-assisted suicide is a
weighty enough topic of its own, but I think it is impossible to provide a
well-rounded picture of the court decisions and the underlying philosophy
these decisions express without exploring the linkage with abortion. There
is, for example, just one brief mention in Dyck's book of the Supreme
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Court's decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). This is a real
puzzle given how prominent a role that decision played in subsequent
judicial treatments of physician-assisted suicide.
Second, I found inadequate Dyck's treatment of the relationship
between physician-assisted suicide and the refusal of life-sustaining
medical treatment. This is a central portion of the book. Dyck largely
defends Chief Justice's Rehnquist's conclusion in the 1997 assisted suicide
cases that "[t]he distinction between letting a patient die and making that
patient die is important, logical, rational, and well established." Most of
Dyck's discussion of this issue is sound, yet I found it to be troubling in
some significant respects. He defends the permissibility of what he terms
"comfort-only care" even when this care clearly hastens death. I agree that
there is a case to be made for this distinction, but it depends greatly on how
one defines "comfort-only care." At one point (p. 38) he seems to equate
"comfort-only care" with passive euthanasia, and I don't think he
adequately treats just how threatening an acceptance of passive euthanasia
is to what I take to be the thrust of the whole book- that is, to defend the
sanctity of life, or as Dyck sometimes describes the matter, the incalculable
worth ofthe life of each individual. And, I don't think he adequately comes
to grip with the reality that many of the "refusal of life-sustaining
treatment" cases in the courts really do accept the permissibility of lethal
choices and an acceptance of the idea that some lives are not worth
living-concepts that Dyck effectively criticizes in the rest of the book.
In the end, reading this book left me uncertain how Dyck would
handle the withdrawal of food and water cases. (He has criticized the
withdrawal of food and water from patients in a persistent vegetative state
in earlier writings.) His principles seem sound (he does seem to focus on
the important point that the issue in these cases involves determining
whether the treatment is burdensome, not whether the patient's life is a
burden), but he does not explore at all the threat that these cases truly
represent. Because this book is characterized by much clear thinking, I
found this ambiguity striking. (I have discussed the food and water cases in
some detail in a recent article. See Richard S. Myers, "Physician-Assisted
Suicide: A Current Legal Perspective," 1 National Catholic Bioethics
Quarterly 345,356-361 (2001).)
Third, I thought it a bit odd that his treatment reflects no real
engagement with Catholic thought on these issues. Dyck is not a Catholic
[I don't think], and he tries to put theological issues to one side, but I think
it would have enriched the book if -he had discussed, for example, the
thought of Pope John Paul II as expressed in Veritatis Splendor and
Evangelium Vitae. No one has written more eloquently or persuasively on
the clash between the culture of life and the culture of death than Pope
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John Paul II, and so it is, I think, a significant omission to leave him out of
the discussion altogether.
Fourth, I thought that Dyck's discussion was disengaged from the
broader cultural forces in play. He seems to reflect some confidence that
his new synthesis will work us out of the problems that we are facing in
this area. The tone at times almost seems to reflect the belief that we can
solve these problems if we just clarify our thinking. I think he understates
the extent to which the culture of death has been institutionalized in our
culture (maybe this is due to his neglect of abortion), and that the long-term
battle is really spiritual, and not just legal or moral.
On the whole, however, Dyck's short book is worth reading. I think,
in particular, that his more communal understanding of human rights is
valuable. As he notes, "[h]uman rights become actual only through actions,
patterns of behavior, and social arrangements that render their actualization
possible." (p. 91.) And, as he also notes, it is essential that our "law reflects,
teaches, and supports the incalculable worth of the life of each individual."
(p. 119.)
- Richard S. Myers,
Professor of Law,
Ave Maria School of Law.
The Healer's Calling: A Spirituality for Physicians and Other Health Care
Professionals by Daniel P. Sulmasy, O.EM. , M.D., (New YorkIMahwah,
N.J.: Paulist Press, 1997) 135 pages, paperback, $11.95

Sulmasy, a Franciscan brother and a physician, writes that his book
evolved from a retreat he gave for physicians. The material comes from his
experience of being a Christian who works as a health care professional.
The book should be understood "as a series of reflections on the lived
spiritual experience of one Christian health care professional, asking where
God is to be found in the work of health care, and asking where a person
who purports to be a follower of Jesus of Nazareth can lay claim to the
work of health care in the name of the kingdom of God."(p. 3)
Sulmasy senses a malaise among health care professionals that is
partly, if not wholly, a spiritual affair. While medicine is able to do more
and more for the patient, health care professionals are taking less
satisfaction from their work. Status, money, vacation time are not enough
to motivate the hard work of these professionals. Clinical work itself will
not cover the sense of despair and frustration. While repairing a damaged
patient does bring a certain amount of joy and satisfaction, it is not enough
to satisfy one's longings. Only the pursuit of one's ultimate end, union with
God, will quench human longings.
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